Drawing 
Introduction
Hereditary traditional authorities 1 in postcolonial Africa have frequently experienced uncertainties with regard to their institutional and constitutional status in young African democracies. 2 This is in part because they draw much of their power not from the ballot box, but from a different, supposedly more ancient wellspring of signification and power. The post-1994 situation in South Africa is in many respects no different. 3 The legacy of chiefs in the South Africa is mixed. Although some traditional authorities were instrumental in the struggle against colonialism during the 19 th century and against segregation and apartheid during the twentieth century, many traditional authorities were complicit in the elaboration of apartheid policies and legislation in rural, especially
Bantustan, areas in the period since the 1950s. 4 Hendricks and Ntsebeza, two staunch critics of the resurgence of traditional authorities, stuck to first principles when they argued that the chieftaincy was 'inherently undemocratic…[since] chiefs are not elected by popular vote but imposed on the basis of ascription and lineage and [because] there is very little chance of women becoming traditional authorities'. 5 However, contrary to the popular expectation that after 1994 traditional authorities would atrophy and slowly disappear, their spokespeople have become increasingly assertive and their resurgence over the two decades since 1994 is clearly evident.
We argue that the project to institutionalise democracy in South Africa has taken place on terrain far more complex than a binary opposition between modern urban democrats and traditional rural despots and their respective supporters. 6 In particular, we argue that the resurgence of traditional authority lies in the opportunities that opened up with the simultaneity of the global neo-liberal economic shifts of the 1990s and the complex reassertion of African identity politics. Identity politics in this context include, among other things, an affirmation of indigenous cultural practice, the assertion of gender equality and strident calls for the return of land to African ownership. But the resurgence should also be situated within the realpolitik of shifting alliances and multi-layered, political-economic interests that have manifested in struggles around development at local, provincial and national levels of the ANC-led government. 7 Given that this is a review paper, and that these are wide-ranging issues, in the substantive sections that follow we briefly review just three issues that we think help us to understand the resurgence, with particular reference to the Eastern Cape Province. These issues are the uneven institutionalisation of the provincial
House of Traditional Leaders, traditional authorities and gender politics, and the vexed questions of land ownership and development. 
The challenges and opportunities of the administrative and institutional reconfiguration of the country
The period 1990-1996 was characterised by the pressing need to deliver a workable political compromise that was based on a negotiated transfer of political power at the national level, with considerable mistrust and political intrigue between the negotiating parties. There relatively autonomous governmental institutions'. R. Sklar (1994) opportunities that they managed to exploit to the benefit of their organisation and its members. Indeed, these two were among a set of well-educated, articulate and -as Gibbs points out -well-connected individuals who proved adept at turning a period of uncertainty and transition to their political advantage. 11 They not only imbibed the tenets of the Contralesa Constitution of 1987 which committed the organisation "to unite all traditional leaders and to school them in the politics of liberation, to fight for the eradication of the Bantustan system, to win back the lands 'stolen' from their forefathers during colonialism, and to contribute to the struggle for a unitary, non-racial and democratic South Africa", but they also worked tirelessly to reinsert themselves into both the ANC's national leadership and its regional Xhosa leadership in the Eastern Cape.
3.
Three Presidents, three attempts to grasp the nettle that is traditional authority 12 When Nelson Mandela became president of South Africa in 1994, after decades of the organisation being banned and its leaders imprisoned or exiled, the ANC was organisationally weak, particularly in rural areas. It was specifically in the provinces in which
Bantustan administrations had existed prior to 1994, that chiefs still wielded power, and asserted their ability to 'deliver the rural vote' (such as in KwaZulu-Natal, in the former Transkei and in Limpopo Province), and thus turn the ANC's organisational weakness to their own advantage.
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In its early efforts to contain the attempts by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to foment full-scale civil war in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), and decisively to wrest rural power in that province away from the IFP's Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the ANC made two concessions to the traditional authorities that Contralesa was quick to capitalise on. 14 The seemingly more innocuous route to steer traditional authorities was as custodians of culture and traditional practices in their specific cultural spheres. This might have been deemed appropriate and sufficient recognition for them in the new democratic dispensation.
Here, it was envisaged, they would oversee traditional matters, such as local succession organisations. Whereas a key objection to traditional authorities since 1994 has been their lack of accountability in processes of democratic governance, this concern was overshadowed by high levels of conflict within newly amalgamated rural local municipalities, their accountability and the 'challenges' of service delivery. Overwhelmingly, traditional authorities declined to take up their ex officio positions and chose instead to sit on the sidelines of conflict-ridden local municipal councils whose squabbles animated the regional newspapers and damaged the credibility of local and national government.
31
Especially telling in this highly contested environment was the inability or unwillingness of the majority of newly elected municipal councillors to engage in meaningful debate and make decisions about land, easily the most significant rural asset, about agricultural development and the provision of rural agricultural infrastructure, mostly because they lacked the technical skills to make informed decisions, but also because they saw rural areas as post-agrarian spaces that required modernisation rather than more agricultural investments. This opened the door for traditional authorities to re-assert themselves, especially among older rural constituencies in this key arena. Thus, the politically weakened traditional authorities found that they could again exert a measure of influence over the day-to-day lives of millions of for rejecting 1913 as the earliest date from which claims for the restoration of land to Africans was to be considered. 43 The ruling party's response was to fudge the key issues, to court the vocal Contralesa spokesmen, and in the process to add considerably to the frustration of its own Department of Land Affairs officials and of many progressive land and gender activists who had supported the state's land reform programme. 44 In the sections that follow, we show -with particular reference to the Eastern Cape Province -that the initial caution with which the ANC in government approached traditional authorities has been replaced by zeal. We demonstrate particularly how traditional authorities assert their opinions in day-to-day politics, even where these opinions are in opposition to key democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution. We focus on three short case studies, viz. the activities of the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders, the issue of gender and traditional institutions, and questions of land administration and development in rural areas.
We find that a common thread running through these cases is the instrumental nature of the debates and the limited space allowed for the public, particularly for rural people, to freely articulate their views on the relevant issues.
The Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders (ECHTL)
Despite Simply put, these are all rather broad, vague responsibilities and it is not clear how, when and by whom they will be operationalised. Our attempts to get information on what exactly the ECHTL does were unsuccessful. The limited responses we received from officials in the House led us to conclude that other than commenting on the male circumcision ritual, visiting initiates in the troubled rural areas, as well as fighting for recognition and power within the province, there is as yet no clear role for the ECHTL that justifies the budget allocated to it.
In the next section, we consider the issue of gender politics and the rights of women under customary law in the post-1994 political dispensation.
Traditional authorities and gender politics
Gender politics have come to characterize some of the key controversies involving the There is a clear tension between the principles of gender equality and some cultural rights that are enshrined in the Constitution. 51 Some cultural practices threaten, and often violate, the rights of women (e.g., land rights) and this violates Section 9(3) of the Constitution, which enshrines equality and non-discrimination based on gender, among other things. 52 Over the past decade, positions articulated by powerful traditional authorities concerning the role of women within different cultures in the Eastern Cape Province provide an illustration of these tensions and how these play an important role in traditional authorities' campaign to be heard. Some examples that illustrate this are discussed below. Sigcawu, and she lodged a case with the Gender Commission on Equality. She argued that she is the rightful heir to the throne of AmaXhosa nation, and that she was passed over for the throne because she is a woman. 56 Significantly, she received no public support from any traditional authorities.
Finally, there is the case of Nolitha Ludidi, who was appointed as the first female
AmaHlubi chief in October 2014. The traditional leader of AmaHlubi people, Langalibalele II Rhadebe, does not recognise Ludidi's leadership role, arguing that 'No woman has ever been appointed permanently as chief'. 57 Sicelo Rhadebe, the traditional leader's spokesperson, tried to explain their opposition to the chieftaincy of Ludidi by saying 'There is no discrimination; it is just custom. In our custom there are specific roles for women and men and there is a reason for that. It would be unfair for the Constitution to abolish our custom'. 58 Ludidi is only the third female chief in the Eastern Cape.
In a controversial move, Chief Phatekile Holomisa, the president of Contralesa, lashed out at women who seek to become traditional leaders, arguing that it was not customary practice. Holomisa defended his position by arguing that: 'this is not unfair discrimination or inequality, but a custom. Traditional leadership is about custom'. 59 He went on to argue that equality as enshrined in the country's Constitution was not randomly applicable. Holomisa's interpretation of the equality clause in the Constitution is what is puzzling about his position because he is a lawyer and a senior member of government. Nowhere in the Constitution does it state that the equality clause is subject to 'custom'. Rather, the equality principle is above all other rights that are contained in the Bill of Rights (See Section 9 of the Constitution).
Again, there was no official censure of these views, which clearly contradicted sections of the Bill of Rights.
The main issue with these examples of deep bias against women on the part of traditional authorities is not that such views exist, but it is the silence on the part of those who are supposed to defend the constitutional rights of all South Africans. It is likely that this silence fosters the impression among the public that traditional authorities have power that matches or even exceeds that of elected politicians. This is because if such views about women were to be promoted by elected politicians, one might expect immediate censure, including calls for their resignation. We argue that this sense of invincibility on the part of traditional authorities is not good for democracy, but it is certainly something that, if not addressed, will undermine the rights of ordinary South Africans. In short, by publicly expressing conservative and sometimes sexist views about gender equality, without being traditional leaders delivering the rural votes is enhanced chiefly control over gender discourse, which may come back to haunt the party in the future.
Traditional authorities, the land and development in rural areas
In 2004, Chief Phatekile Holomisa wrote:
Our advice to Government is that legal title to communal land [should] be in the name of the relevant traditional authority. Failing to do so would further erode the role of traditional leaders in the life of our people, and would serve to cut the ties among the land, the people and their ancestors who bequeathed the land to us. Cape between traditional authorities and elected local government structures around development. 69 He argues that there is a widely held belief among government officials that traditional authorities block development projects simply to discredit elected representatives, while municipalities are said to limit development in areas where traditional authorities appear to be vocal and strong.
There are several reasons to suggest that land administration and rural development are both key issues that traditional authorities are using to claw back some of the powers they Africa. 70 This presents them with an opportunity to use the poverty in these areas to draw attention to their own plight, while also arguing that they are the better alternative for facilitating rural development. 71 Again, as with the case of gender, reluctantly or not, the ANC government appears to be allowing traditional authorities a bigger voice in discourses about rural development and land administration. Ironically, it maybe these very discourses and practices by the chiefs that may gradually turn rural voters away from the ANC.
Conclusions
It is clear that over twenty years after the political transition of 1994, the role of traditional authorities remains a deeply controversial and divisive work in progress. Traditional authorities have seized the opportunities and resources available to them to fight for recognition and, in the process, have secured a future for themselves as a real force in South Africa's political landscape. 72 Just how have the traditional authorities managed to this feat? The levers are many, but we have argued that they include the legacy of kinship, cultural and even personal ties of clanship, especially in the case of people like Nelson Mandela (and Jacob Zuma), who had always been sympathetic to the traditional authorities and sought to welcome them into the ANC fold after 1990. Also important is the realisation on the part of political parties that their access to rural voters is intertwined with respecting and acknowledging traditional authorities as 'custodians' of rural areas. 73 Indeed, the ANC's 'broad church' approach to political mobilisation meant that it sought to incorporate under its umbrella all constituencies that could help it to electorally defeat its political opponents.
As we have argued above, the finely-balanced negotiations and protracted efforts to stave off violent conflict with the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal gave Contralesa valuable early space to manoeuvre within the ANC alliance. 74 Linked to this, the determined, pragmatic and 
